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TRANSFORMATIVENESS IN THE AGE OF 
MASS DIGITIZATION 
MARIE-ALEXIS VALENTE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether we are aware of it or not, the concepts of the fair 
use defense to copyright infringement, including 
transformativeness, have affected our lives in some way.  From 
accessing the Google Books database and search engines to 
conducting legal research, the American public has become 
involved in a controversy surrounding copyright law and the 
principles of fair use.  Fair use is a defense to a copyright 
infringement claim that courts determine based on four statutory 
factors articulated in the Copyright Act.1  Interestingly, one 
consideration not explicitly mentioned in the statute that courts 
heavily weigh in deciding fair use is what has come to be known 
as transformativeness.  As a subfactor of factor one—“the 
purpose and character of the use”—transformativeness explores 
the extent to which the use of a copyrighted work gives the 
original a new purpose or meaning.2  This judge-created concept 
has been applied more expansively since its inception, and the 
rise of the digital age, with mass reproduction in digital form, has 
led to a pivotal inflection point for reconsideration of the fair use 
doctrine and transformativeness. 
 
 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review & Journal of Catholic Legal 
Studies; J.D., 2016, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 
2012, Fairfield University. I would like to thank Professor Eva Subotnik for her 
invaluable guidance and advice throughout the process of writing this Note. 
1 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
2 Id. 
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While copyright law has deep roots in the history of our legal 
system,3 transformativeness in the context of fair use is a more 
recent development.  It was not until 1994, in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.,4 that the term became part of judicial analysis.  
In that case, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a 
copyright infringement action filed by a record label against 
members of a rap group for what the rap group argued was a 
parody use of the copyrighted song.5  The Court indicated that 
parody could constitute fair use of a copyrighted work under the 
first factor of the fair use analysis because it was 
“transformative.”6  The Court adopted this “transformative” 
concept from Judge Pierre Leval’s article, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard,7 and determined that a transformative use of 
copyrighted material is one that “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character.”8 
Since the Campbell case, federal courts have heard a 
multitude of fair use cases and have decided them based in part 
on this transformativeness concept.  However, what began as a 
check on the expansion of copyright and a way to balance societal 
and copyright holders’ interests has since morphed into a broad 
application by judges when they perceive a socially beneficial 
use.9  As a result, some courts, such as the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have recently rejected the 
approach of examining whether a use is transformative in 
circumstances where content is artistically altered because it 
replaces the § 107 factors and potentially overrides authors’ 
derivative work rights.10  By contrast, other recent cases 
involving digitized copyrighted sources have found verbatim uses 
of those sources to be transformative because judges have 
stretched their ideas of what a transformative purpose or use is, 
and found that making a work digitally accessible inherently 
3 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1108–
09 (1990) (discussing the original British copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 
1709, and quoting the statute whose purpose was “for the Encouragement of 
Learned Men to compose and write useful Books.” (citing Act for the Encouragement 
of Learning, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19)). 
4 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
5 Id. at 572–73. 
6 Id. at 578–79. 
7 Id. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 3, at 1111). 
8 Id. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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changed the work.11  This continued expansion of 
transformativeness may be problematic for the optimal balancing 
of interests under copyright policy and may create more 
confusion about what constitutes transformativeness as the 
digital information age moves forward. 
The digital information age has ushered in unprecedented 
large-scale digitized scanning of millions of copyrighted works 
available on the Internet and other digital mediums.12  
Consequently, many aspects of copyright law, including fair use 
and the rights of publishers and creators of works, are impacted 
by this open access.13  Courts must now determine whether such 
digital reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works qualify 
as fair use, and authors and creators question their roles in this 
process of amassing their works into digital libraries and 
databases.14  Business models are affected by digitization, where 
information was previously provided on a “pay-per-view” basis 
and is now free or advertiser supported,15 and questions now 
arise regarding whether there are efficient and cost-effective 
licensing options available.16 
This Note examines and ultimately argues against the 
expansion of transformativeness in verbatim-copying cases, given 
the implications it will have as more copyrighted works are 
digitized.  Part I discusses the background and objectives of the 
Copyright Act, the fair use exception, and the rise of the 
transformativeness subfactor.  Part II provides a summary of 
some predigitization fair use cases to establish some basic 
principles about how courts have ruled on transformativeness.  
Part III examines relevant cases recently decided on the question 
of transformativeness in the context of mass digitization.  Part IV 
critiques the ways courts have arrived at their holdings, 
specifically in overemphasizing societal benefits as a measure of 
transformativeness and overstating the facts of certain cases to 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 Trudi Bellardo Hahn, Impacts of Mass Digitization Projects on Libraries and 
Information Policy, ASS’N FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. BULL. (Oct./Nov. 2006), http:// 
www.asis.org/Bulletin/Oct-06/hahn.html. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION: A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT i−ii (Oct. 2011), http:// 
www.copyright.gov/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf. 
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find a transformative purpose or character where one may not 
exist.  This section will also offer a more appropriate analysis 
that courts should follow in determining whether certain cases of 
verbatim-copying and digitization are transformative.  Finally, it 
will discuss some possible licensing options to abate the judicial 
expansion of transformativeness. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
The grant of copyright power to Congress is fundamental, 
having been enumerated in the Constitution.17  This includes the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”18  
The United States Supreme Court has held that this clause lends 
itself to the creation of copyright laws designed to further the 
utilitarian goals of increasing the progress of knowledge for the 
improvement of society.19  The underlying idea is that by 
granting an author a limited monopoly on her writings and 
works, she will become motivated to create literary and artistic 
works that benefit society.20 
The modern Copyright Act of 1976 protects “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device.”21  Works protected under this 
definition include literary, musical, pictorial, graphic, and 
audiovisual works that express ideas, compilations, and 
derivative works.22  An owner of a copyright has the exclusive 
right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, and 
publicly display his or her copyrighted works.23 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
18 Id. 
19 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(“[This] limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be 
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by 
the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of 
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”). 
20 Leval, supra note 3, at 1108. 
21 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
22 Id. §§ 102−103. 
23 Id. § 106. 
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In furthering the utilitarian objectives of copyright law by 
stimulating the production of creative works without impeding 
incentives to create them, the Copyright Act provides an 
exception to this monopoly: the fair use doctrine.24  The statute 
provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not 
an infringement of copyright.”25  The factors to consider when 
determining if a use is covered by this doctrine are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.26 
Although the fair use factors are statutorily created, courts 
have developed their own means of interpreting the statute with 
additional subfactors to consider.27  The first factor, the purpose 
and character of the use and its commerciality, carries much of 
the weight and is important in determining fair use.28  This is 
evidenced by the fact that judges have focused much of their 
discussions in fair use cases on the first factor compared to some 
of the other factors.29  The subfactors of factor one have developed 
separately through scholarly commentary and case law.30  While 
the statutorily required commerciality inquiry became a 
significant focal point after Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.,31 it was not until Judge Leval proposed that 
courts shift their focus on the character and purpose of the use to 
“transformativeness” that that nonstatutory subfactors gained 
more attention in Campbell and subsequent cases.32  A court’s 
analysis under this subfactor considers whether the new work 
24 Leval, supra note 3, at 1110. 
25 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
26 Id. 
27 Leval, supra note 3, at 1106. 
28 Id. at 1111. 
29 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 587 (2008). 
30 Id. at 597–98. 
31 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). Courts began focusing on commerciability after the 
Supreme Court held that every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively unfair. Beebe, supra note 29, at 598. 
32 Beebe, supra note 29, at 603. 
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“merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ ”33 of the original work or adds 
something new “with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”34  
The Supreme Court has held that the more transformative a new 
work is, the less significant the other factors will be in a finding 
of fair use.35 
Throughout the many transformative inquiries courts have 
analyzed in fair uses cases, two main types have informed courts’ 
analyses under the first factor: transformative use and 
transformative purpose.36  A transformative use repurposes the 
copyrighted work to create a new work, such as a parody or other 
artistic use of the work, and changes the work’s character.37  By 
contrast, a transformative purpose exists when a copyrighted 
work is copied verbatim but is put to a new purpose.38  Physical 
changes are not necessary to find a transformative purpose; 
where the work is put into a new context, given new insights, or 
serves a different function than the original, courts may find in 
favor of transformativeness.39  The difference is that a 
transformative use produces a new work while a transformative 
purpose takes an exact copy of the work and applies it to a new 
purpose.  The Supreme Court has thus far only addressed the 
concept of transformativeness as it applies to parody in 
Campbell—that is, transformative use—and not verbatim 
copying.40 
Against this evolutionary background, today’s technological 
advancements, including the digitization of artistic and literary 
works, have further complicated copyright law and the fair use 
doctrine, and have created a problem for transformative purpose.  
Since the electronic information age began and copyrighted 
works started appearing on the Internet, courts have followed a 
33 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
9,401)). 
34 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 3, at 1111). 
35 Id. 
36 Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 836 (2010). 
37 Id. 
38 Michael D. Murray, What is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the 
Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use 
Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260, 273 (2012). 
39 Id. 
40 Barry Sookman, The Google Book Project: Is It Fair Use?, 61 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'Y U.S.A. 485, 497 (2014). 
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trend in expanding the concept of transformativeness.41  In many 
cases, courts have surprisingly found that verbatim copying and 
digitizing of copyrighted documents were transformative because 
they became part of an online search system.42  In the context of 
books, the Copyright Office has adopted the term “mass 
digitization” to encompass large-scale scanning and left open the 
possibility that scanning fewer books may also qualify as mass 
digitization.43  Music, photographs, and other works are also 
capable of being mass-digitized.44  The Copyright Act did not 
directly address mass digitization, so the issue requires 
examining long-established copyright and fair use principles and 
applying them to this new context. 
II. EARLY CASES ESTABLISHING CONTOURS OF 
TRANSFORMATIVENESS IN THE VERBATIM COPYING CONTEXT 
To understand the development of transformativeness in 
mass digitization cases today, it is helpful to examine some of the 
early contexts in which this doctrine was applied to pre-mass 
digitization verbatim copying.  One of the earliest and most cited 
cases involving verbatim copying is Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., where Universal City Studios and 
other members of the film industry sued Sony for copyright 
infringement of their television broadcasts.45  Sony manufactured 
and sold Betamax video tape recorders that were able to record 
commercially sponsored television programs broadcast on public 
airwaves.46  The plaintiff studios alleged that some individuals 
used Betamax recorders to record their copyrighted works on 
television and had infringed their copyrights, and that the 
defendant corporation was liable for selling the Betamax 
recorders.47  The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
Sony, determining that the recording of copyrighted television 
programs for later viewing was a noncommercial, nonprofit 
activity for individuals watching privately at home.48  The Court 
41 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBL. & THE ARTS § 1:31:70 (3d ed. 2004). 
42 1 Information Law § 4:14, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015). 
43 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 16, at 8–9. 
44 Id. at 15. 
45 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 449. 
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determined that recording in this instance allowed viewers to see 
a work they could have viewed for free at an earlier time—so-
called “time-shifting”—and the fact that the entire work was 
reproduced did not preclude fair use.49  In fact, the Court found 
that there was no potential harm to the studio in the 
broadcasting market, and that there was a public interest in 
making television broadcasts more available to a wider 
audience.50  This was one of the first times a court held that 
reproducing a copyrighted work with no new purpose could still 
pass the first factor of fair use.51 
After the concept of transformativeness was introduced in 
Campbell,52 it was applied in another well-known verbatim 
copying case, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.53  The 
defendant, Texaco, employed researchers to conduct scientific 
research and develop new products and technology in the 
petroleum industry, and subscribed to various scientific and 
technical journals.54  The plaintiffs, publishers of the scientific 
and technical journals, brought suit against Texaco for the 
unauthorized photocopying of articles from their journals.55  
Chickering, a chemical engineer at one of Texaco’s facilities, 
reviewed published works in one of the publisher’s journals, and 
was found to have photocopied articles from the journal and 
stored them in his files for later use.56  Texaco asserted a fair use 
defense, and the district court held that the copying was not 
fair.57 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, and determined 
that Chickering had photocopied the articles for the same basic 
purpose that subscribers would normally obtain the original 
journal articles—“to have it available on his shelf for ready 
49 Id. at 449–50. 
50 Id. at 454. 
51 Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1383, 1383 (2014). 
52 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
53 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
54 Id. at 915. 
55 Id. at 914. 
56 Id. at 915. It was presumed that many other employees at the facility had 
done the same, but the parties agreed to choose one researcher at random as a 
representative of the group to avoid expenses of exploring the photocopying practices 
of each researcher. Id. 
57 Id. at 914. 
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reference if and when he needed to look at it.”58  Overall, the 
Second Circuit found the purpose to be archival, primarily to 
provide Texaco scientists with a copy of the original articles 
without having to purchase more than one copy of the original 
journal, and it “ ‘supersed[ed] the objects’ of the original 
creation.”59  It held that “the making of copies to be placed on the 
shelf in Chickering’s office [was] part of a systematic process of 
encouraging employee researchers to copy articles so as to 
multiply available copies while avoiding payment.”60  The court 
noted that the use may lead to a public benefit of greater 
research and technical developments, but that the defendant 
would still reap an unfair economic advantage from the 
unauthorized copying without paying the copyright holder.61  
Importantly, the photocopying merely transformed the material 
object embodying the intangible article from the journal format 
to a photocopy, and did not transform the copyrighted article 
itself.62  While it may have converted the original into a more 
useful format: 
[W]hatever independent value derives from the more usable 
format of the photocopy does not mean that every instance of 
photocopying wins on the first factor.  In this case, the 
predominant archival purpose of the copying tips the first factor 
against the copier, despite the benefit of a more usable format.63 
The Sixth Circuit also reviewed the issue of 
transformativeness in verbatim copying.64  In Princeton 
University Press v. Michigan Document Services,65 the defendant, 
a commercial copyshop, reproduced substantial portions of 
copyrighted scholarly works and bound them into coursepacks for 
student use in reading assignments given by professors at the 
University of Michigan.66  The copyshop did so without seeking or 
obtaining permission from copyright owners, and the plaintiff 
58 Id. at 918. 
59 Id. at 919–20 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994)). 
60 Id. at 920. 
61 Id. at 922. 
62 Id. at 923. 
63 Id. at 924. 
64 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th 
Cir. 1996). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1383. 
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publishers filed suit for copyright infringement.67  The district 
court found that the copyshop did not have a fair use defense, 
and on appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed.68  In considering the 
transformativeness of the coursepacks, the court stated, “If you 
make verbatim copies of 95 pages of a 316-page book, you have 
not transformed the 95 pages very much—even if you juxtapose 
them to excerpts from other works and package everything 
conveniently.”69 
Transformativeness in the verbatim-copying context was 
again analyzed by the Second Circuit in Infinity Broadcast Corp. 
v. Kirkwood.70  In that case, the defendant, Kirkwood, designed 
Dial-Up, a system that allowed customers to listen to radio 
broadcasts around the United States by connecting a radio 
receiver to a phone line.71  The receiver would receive broadcasts 
over the air, transmit them into phone lines, and allow callers to 
listen to whatever radio station to which the receiver was 
tuned.72  The plaintiff owned a network of radio stations, 
including stations in markets where Dial-Up had receivers, and 
it owned certain syndicated programs broadcast in other markets 
in exchange for a fee or advertising time.73  Upon learning that 
Dial-Up users could gain access to and record radio programs 
broadcast on its stations, it filed claims against the defendant for 
copyright infringement.74  The district court held that Kirkwood’s 
use was fair, but the Second Circuit reversed on appeal.75  While 
the district court found transformative purpose in Kirkwood’s use 
of the broadcast for information rather than entertainment, the 
Second Circuit stated that a difference in purpose is not the same 
as a lawful transformation.76  Kirkwood sold unaltered radio 
broadcasts, and its target audiences did not exactly transform 
the broadcasts either; they may not have been listening to 
entertain themselves but they still derived entertainment value 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1389. 
70 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998). 
71 Id. at 106. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 107. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 105. 
76 Id. at 108. 
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from them, rather than informational content.77  The court 
reasoned that “[t]alent scouts, who admittedly would not be 
listening in order to be entertained themselves, would 
nevertheless be listening for the entertainment value of the 
broadcasts rather than the factual content.”78  The court was also 
unconvinced by the argument that the service provided the 
societal benefit of enabling advertisers to confirm that their 
commercials were being played.79  There were other means of 
accomplishing that goal and it was not enough to overcome the 
nontransformative retransmission.80 
These earlier cases of fair use provide several basic 
principles about transformativeness in the context of verbatim 
reproduction.  First, a change in the context of a work without 
changing the content may be transformative if the purpose and 
function of the new work is sufficiently different from the 
original;81 however, without a new purpose that communicates a 
new meaning, the subsequent use may fail.82  Second, archival 
usage of original copyrighted works has “the potential to create a 
new function and meaning for the work, and may meet fair use 
objectives if the use has a proper purpose that is different from 
exploitation of the creative original value and meaning of the 
original work.”83  Third, simply copying the original work will not 
meet the transformative requirement, even if there is an 
educational or other general public benefit, unless there is a 
change in the meaning and purpose of the work.84  Lastly, 
copying a work that merely places it in a new medium of 
communication without changing its purpose or meaning may 
not be transformative.85 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 108–09. 
80 Id. 
81 See id.; Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 
(6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
82 Murray, supra note 38, at 279–80. 
83 Id. at 285. 
84 Id. at 287. 
85 Id. at 261. See also Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 
F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that presenting an audiovisual work into a new 
medium does not amount to transformative use where the content of the work is not 
altered). 
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III. CASES OF VERBATIM COPYING AND DIGITIZATION OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 
With the rise of mass digitization over the last decade, 
copyrighted works have been reproduced on a much larger 
scale.86  In such cases, many copyright holders have brought 
infringement suits in response, but the courts have applied the 
fair use and transformative inquiries differently compared to 
previous verbatim copying cases.87  Public benefit has played a 
larger role in courts’ analyses than previously, and even where a 
second use has no new purpose, courts have surprisingly found 
that the use is transformative largely based on their perceived 
notions of a societal benefit.88  This section analyzes several 
categories of cases where this expansion of transformativeness 
has occurred.  While many cases fall into overlapping categories, 
this Note attempts to distinguish and organize them more 
coherently. 
A. Internet Search Engines 
Two seminal cases that exemplify courts’ evolving 
approaches to the transformativeness of copies on Internet 
search engines are Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.89 and 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.90  In Perfect 10, Google had an 
agreement with Amazon whereby Amazon routed users’ search 
queries to Google and transmitted Google’s responses back to 
users.91  Plaintiff, Perfect 10, Inc., marketed and sold images of 
nude models and offered a monthly subscription to users to view 
password-protected images.92  It also licensed a third party to sell 
and distribute reduced-size copyrighted images for download and 
use on cell phones.93  When certain websites began republishing 
Perfect 10’s images without authorization, Google’s search engine 
began indexing the webpages containing the unauthorized 
images and provided thumbnail versions of the images on its 
86 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 16, at 8–9. 
87 See infra Part III.A–D. 
88 See infra Part III.A–D. 
89 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
90 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002). 
91 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1157. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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Google Image Search database.94  When a user clicked on the 
thumbnail, “the user’s browser accesse[d] the third-party 
webpage and in-line link[ed] to the full-sized infringing image 
stored on the website publisher’s computer.  This image 
appear[ed], in its original context, on the lower portion of the 
window on the user’s computer screen framed by information 
from Google’s webpage.”95 
Perfect 10 claimed that Google’s display of its thumbnail 
images and in-line linking to the full-sized images infringed 
Perfect 10’s copyright in those images and sought a preliminary 
injunction.96  Google asserted a fair use defense.97  The district 
court granted in part and denied in part the preliminary 
injunction against Google and denied the preliminary injunction 
against Amazon, and Perfect 10 appealed.98 
In reviewing the transformativeness factor, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit looked to Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp.,99 where a photographer brought suit against 
Arriba, operator of an Internet search engine, for copyright 
infringement.100  This search engine also provided thumbnail 
images of copyrighted photographs, and the Ninth Circuit held 
that these thumbnail images were transformative because of the 
transformative nature of a search engine’s function and its public 
benefit.101  That is, Arriba’s use of the images served a different 
purpose and function than the photographer’s, and such use 
improved access to information on the Internet.102  Relying on the 
holding from Kelly, the court in Perfect 10 likewise determined 
that a search engine is transformative because it “transforms the 
image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information”103 
and is socially beneficial because it “incorpor[ates] an original 
work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”104  
Contrasting this case with Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1163. 
98 Id. at 1157. 
99 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
100 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1164 (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815–16). 
101 Id. (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818–22). 
102 Id. at 1165 (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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Kirkwood,105 where a broadcaster’s retransmission of a radio 
broadcast was not transformative since its purpose and meaning 
were the same as the original, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Google’s use of Perfect 10’s images as thumbnails provided “a 
new context to serve a different purpose.”106  Moreover, the 
significantly transformative nature of Google’s use and the public 
benefit provided by its search engine outweighed any 
superseding or commercial aspects of its use of Perfect 10’s 
images.107 
B. Mass Digitization for Student-Oriented and Research 
Purposes 
Similar to the copying in Texaco, digital copying and 
archiving involves making copies of a work and storing them 
digitally on a server for access at any time.108  This mass 
digitization has recently become an issue in the context of 
student-related uses and general research needs.109  However, 
courts are split on the issue.  Some courts have found this type of 
digital copying transformative since its purpose is different from 
that of the original, while others find no new purpose just 
because the copying is digital. 
In A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC,110 plaintiff 
students brought suit against iParadigms for copyright 
infringement of essays they wrote for submission to their high 
school teachers through the defendant’s online plagiarism 
detection service.111  The defendant owned and operated 
“Turnitin Plagiarism Detection Service” which allowed high 
school and college educators to evaluate the originality of their 
students’ work.112  A school could subscribe to iParadigms’ 
service, and students would be required to submit their work 
through the web-based system.113  Turnitin would then compare 
105 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998). 
106 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. 
107 Id. at 1166. 
108 Dale Flecker, Digital Archiving: What Is Involved?, EDUCAUSE REVIEW 
(Jan./Feb. 2003), https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/erm0316.pdf. 
109 See infra Part III.B. 
110 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
111 Id. at 633–34. 
112 Id. at 634. 
113 Id. 
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the students’ work with content already available online.114  The 
students’ work would subsequently become archived for future 
comparisons.115  But for this process to occur, students had to 
agree through a “Clickwrap Agreement” when creating a profile 
to use the service.116 
Four high school students brought suit against iParadigms, 
claiming that they submitted a disclaimer on their assignments, 
which objected to the archiving of their work.117  In reviewing the 
defendant’s fair use defense, the district court held that 
iParadigms’ use of the plaintiffs’ work was transformative 
because “its purpose was to prevent plagiarism by comparative 
use, and that iParadigms’ use of the student works did not 
impair the market value for high school term papers and other 
such student works.”118  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that 
while the commercial factor of the analysis tended to weigh 
against fair use, it had to be weighed alongside the other factors 
and was thus not determinative.119  The plaintiffs argued that the 
district court erred in holding that iParadigms did not add 
anything new to a work to make it transformative, but simply 
stored the work in its archives.120  They argued in the alternative 
that iParadigms still failed the transformativeness test because 
its service did not always prevent plagiarism and therefore did 
not have a transformative purpose.121  The appellate court 
disagreed, holding that “[t]he use of a copyrighted work need not 
alter or augment the work to be transformative in nature.  
Rather, it can be transformative in function or purpose without 
altering or actually adding to the original work.”122  Furthermore, 
the court determined that the use did not need to achieve its 
purpose perfectly, and that iParadigms’ use of the works was 
transformative because it was “completely unrelated to 
expressive content” and was intended to discourage plagiarism.123 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 635. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 636. 
119 Id. at 639. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 639–40. 
122 Id. at 639. 
123 Id. at 640. 
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Another case involving the issue of digital copying is 
Cambridge University Press v. Becker.124  Plaintiffs were 
university presses that published scholarly books and journals, 
marketed these books to professors in colleges and universities, 
and even sent them complimentary copies.125  Georgia State 
University maintained an electronic uLearn course management 
system and used ERES, an online reserves system of digital files, 
to distribute course material.126  Professors at the university 
posted excerpts of copyrighted works on ERES for student 
access.127  There were seventy-five excerpts of copyrighted books 
at issue, selected from sixty-four books by twenty-three 
professors, which on average made up 10.1% of pages in the 
copyrighted books.128  The school’s Copyright Policy included a set 
of fair use factors that professors were to consider before 
distributing copyrighted materials.129  Moreover, professors were 
told at training sessions that copying as much as 20% of the 
copyrighted source would be ideal to pass the fair use test.130  
Students could then access these copyrighted readings from the 
ERES system and could print, save, and download copies of the 
readings.131 
In 2008, Cambridge University Press and other academic 
publishers brought suit against Georgia State University officials 
for copyright infringement in the form of electronically posting 
unlicensed portions of copyrighted books and making them 
electronically available to students.132  The plaintiffs sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney fees.133  The 
defendants argued, among other things, that there was no 
copyright infringement and claimed the defense of fair use.134 
In reviewing the defendants’ fair use defense, the district 
court looked to Campbell and the language of § 107 of the 
Copyright Act for guidance, determining that the first factor—the 
124 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), 
rev’d sub nom. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). 
125 Id. at 1211. 
126 Id. at 1218. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1218–19. 
129 Id. at 1219. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1220. 
132 Id. at 1201. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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purpose and character of the use—favored the defendants.135  The 
plaintiffs argued that the straight copying of copyrighted sources 
onto the ERES system was nontransformative; they relied on 
cases such as Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp.,136 
which involved commercial copiers that produced printed 
coursepacks using copyrighted materials but unsuccessfully 
attempted to characterize their copying as noncommercial and 
nonprofit.137  The court in Cambridge University Press largely 
found for the defendants based on the education-prompting 
language in § 107, which states that “the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as . . . teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.”138  It agreed, however, with the plaintiff’s 
characterization of the copying as nontransformative.139  That 
characterization did not preclude fair use since “[t]he obvious 
statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses is the 
straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom 
distribution.”140 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case.141  It agreed that the defendants’ use was not 
transformative since the excerpts of the plaintiffs’ works posted 
on ERES were mere verbatim copies of the original works; they 
were simply converted into digital format and gave the copies no 
new meaning.142  The secondary use was done with the same 
intrinsic purpose as the original—to provide students with 
reading material for university courses.143  Further, while 
electronic reserve systems enhanced and simplified access to 
excerpts of the plaintiffs’ works, they did not transform those 
works, but merely superseded the objects of the original 
135 Id. at 1224. 
136 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
137 Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
138 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2012); Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at  
1224–25. 
139 Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224–25. 
140 Id. at 1224–25 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 
n.11 (1994)). 
141 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014). 
142 Id. at 1263. 
143 Id. 
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creation.144  However, despite the nontransformative nature of 
the use, the court still found that the use satisfied factor one of 
§ 107 due to its educational purpose and noncommercial 
nature.145  The court stated: 
Although GSU certainly benefits from its use of Plaintiffs’ 
works by being able to provide the works conveniently to 
students, and profits in the sense that it avoids paying licensing 
fees, Defendants’ use is not fairly characterized as “commercial 
exploitation.”  Even if Defendants’ use profits GSU in some 
sense, we are not convinced that this type of benefit is indicative 
of “commercial” use.  There is no evidence that Defendants 
capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of copying 
Plaintiffs’ works.  At the same time, the use provides a broader 
public benefit-furthering the education of students at a public 
university.146 
Accordingly, while it did not find a new purpose that made the 
use transformative, the Eleventh Circuit still focused on the 
public benefit of furthering education as part of its rationale for 
finding an educational, noncommercial use. 
C. Digital Libraries 
The rise of digital libraries or repositories, where users scan 
and aggregate books digitally, which are accessible over a 
network,147 has led to lengthy litigation involving whether these 
uses are copyright infringements.  Digital libraries store 
collections of information systematically, and, unlike other types 
of digital repositories, “information is organized on computers 
and available over a network, with procedures to select the 
material in the collections, to organize it, to make it available to 
users, and to archive it.”148  Two major cases to come out of this 
digital library dispute are Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust149 
and Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.150 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1263, 1267. 
146 Id. at 1267. 
147 WILLIAM Y. ARMS, DIGITAL LIBRARIES 2 (2015), as reprinted in  
Definitions of Digital Library, WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY, 
http://home.wlu.edu/~whaleyt/classes/DigiLib/Whaley/Definition.html (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2016). 
148 Id. 
149 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
150 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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In Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, several research 
universities, including the University of Michigan, the University 
of California at Berkeley, Cornell University, and the University 
of Indiana, allowed Google to electronically scan the books stored 
in their collections.151  In 2008, thirteen universities announced 
that they were forming an organization called HathiTrust to 
create a digital repository for the digital copies.152  HathiTrust 
would create a library known as “HathiTrust Digital Library,” or 
“HDL,” containing over ten million works.153  HDL permitted the 
general public to search for terms across all the digital copies in 
the library and only showed the page numbers on which the 
search terms were located and the number of times the search 
term appeared on the page.154  It did not display text from the 
copyrighted work to the users, so the users could not view the 
page or any other part of the copyrighted source.155  However, 
member libraries permitted patrons with print disabilities to 
access the full text of the copyrighted material and allowed them 
to create replacement copies of the works.156  HDL stored copies 
of the works on servers across the member universities with the 
full text of the work and images of each page in the work as they 
appeared in print version.157 
The Authors Association sued HathiTrust for copyright 
infringement, and the district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of HathiTrust on fair use grounds.158  On appeal, the 
Second Circuit described transformativeness as a use that 
“serves a new and different function from the original work and 
is not a substitute for it.”159  With respect to search functionality, 
it found that the HDL had to create digital copies of all 
copyrighted books to carry out this transformative use and only 
permitted users to search for terms.160  In the Second Circuit’s 
view, this was different in “purpose, character, expression, 
meaning, and message from the page (and the book) from which 
151 755 F.3d at 90. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 91. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 91–92. 
157 Id. at 92. 
158 Id. at 92–93. 
159 Id. at 96. 
160 Id. at 98. 
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it [was] drawn.”161  This was a different purpose from the original 
since authors did not create these works for the purpose of 
enabling a text-searchable database.162  The court further 
explained that compared to other cases where it approved a use 
as transformative,163 the use in this case was even more 
transformative because full-text search capabilities added more 
to the copyrighted materials.164  By contrast, providing access to 
the print-disabled person was not transformative in the court’s 
view because the underlying purpose of HDL’s use was the same 
as the authors’ original purpose.165  The format was changed to 
one that was accessible to the disabled, but the underlying 
purpose of HDL’s use was to allow the authors’ books to be 
read.166  Simply enabling a new audience to access a copyrighted 
work did not pass the transformativeness test, although the use 
was still ultimately fair.167 
In a related case, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,168 the 
Authors Guild sued Google for copyright infringement after the 
search engine scanned copyrighted books and included them in a 
digital library on its Google Books database.169  The books were 
available for its library project partners to download, and 
excerpts of the books were displayed to the public.170  The district 
court found Google’s use to be transformative.171  According to the 
court, this digital library was a research tool for other libraries, 
and it digitized books and transformed the text into an index that 
allowed users to find other books.172  It reasoned: 
The display of snippets of text for search is similar to the 
display of thumbnail images of photographs for search or small 
161 Id. at 97. 
162 Id. 
163 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the 
Second Circuit found certain photograph collages were transformative, even though 
the collages were cast in the same medium as the copyrighted photographs). It also 
compares it to the transformative use found in Perfect 10, iParadigms, and Kelly. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97–98. 
164 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97. 
165 Id. at 101. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 101–02. A third use, copying for preservation, was deemed not 
appropriate for determination by the court. Id. at 103–04. 
168 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
169 Id. at 286–89. 
170 Id. at 289. 
171 Id. at 291. 
172 Id. 
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images of concert posters for reference to past events, as the 
snippets help users locate books and determine whether they 
may be of interest.  Google Books thus uses words for a different 
purpose—it uses snippets of text to act as pointers directing 
users to a broad selection of books.173 
Furthermore, the court stated that Google Books was not created 
to read books, but created new information and transformed book 
text into data for research in unprecedented ways.174  Google 
Books provided a public benefit in that readers, scholars, 
researchers, and libraries were able to easily find books, and so 
the use was “highly transformative.”175  Although the court 
acknowledged that Google would benefit commercially from the 
digital library since it would draw more users to its website, the 
court determined that the educational benefit the use provided 
was more important, thus it determined that factor one favored 
fair use.176 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of 
transformativeness.177  The court stated that transformative 
works have the purpose of commenting, criticizing or providing 
information about the original work, and do not necessarily 
involve a change or transformation in form like derivative works 
do.178  The search function of Google’s digital library had the 
transformative purpose of providing users with information 
about the original works according to the court, and “Google 
allows readers to learn the frequency of usage of selected words 
in the aggregate corpus of published books in different historical 
periods. . . . [T]he purpose of this copying is the sort of 
transformative purpose described in Campbell . . . .”179  
Furthermore, the snippet view added to the library’s highly 
transformative purpose because it identified books of interest to 
the user by providing just enough context for the user to know if 
a work is responsive or not.180  The commerciality of Google’s use 
did not dissuade the court from a fair use finding because of the 
highly transformative purpose of the digital library, and because 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 291–92. 
177 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2015). 
178 Id. at 215–16. 
179 Id. at 217. 
180 Id. at 217–18. 
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many of the other accepted fair use purposes, such as 
commentary, criticism, and parody, are conducted for profit as 
well.181 
D. Databases of Legal Documents 
White v. West Publishing Co. exemplifies an instance where a 
copyright owner contested his legal works being placed on 
Internet databases.182  In White, the plaintiff filed suit for 
copyright infringement against West Publishing Corp. and Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. when he discovered that the briefs he wrote on 
behalf of clients for litigation were included on the Westlaw and 
LexisNexis databases without his authorization.183  The 
documents were converted into text-searchable electronic files 
and saved in the databases’ formats.184  Editors then reviewed 
the documents and redacted private information, coded and/or 
extracted key characteristics from the documents to allow users 
to find the documents, and linked the documents to decisions or 
other filings in the same or related cases.185  The court provided 
two reasons for deeming this use transformative.186  First, White 
had created the brief on behalf of his client for purposes of 
litigation, while the publishing corporations used it to create an 
interactive legal research tool.187  Second, the corporations 
“add[ed] something new, with a further purpose or different 
character”188 from the briefs in reviewing, coding, linking, and 
converting the documents into the documents on its databases.189  
While the purpose may have been commercial, the court stated 
that the transformative nature of the use outweighed this 
factor.190  Furthermore, although the use did not do much to alter 
the content of the work, the court followed a view of 
transformativeness that examined a purpose different from the 
original and the addition of some new element to the document.  
The defendants’ use of the briefs as part of an interactive legal 
181 Id. at 218–19. 
182 White v. West Publ’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
183 Id. at 397. 
184 Id. at 398. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 399. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
189 Id. at 399. 
190 Id. 
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research tool was enough for the court to determine it was 
transformative in purpose, possibly implying that the court saw a 
public benefit in what the defendants had done. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
Courts have applied factor one of the fair use doctrine to 
mass digitization cases in a contorted variety of ways191, and 
some of these approaches have been too broad and potentially 
harmful.  Many courts have strayed from the statutory language 
of § 107 and earlier fair use cases.  They have imposed judge-
made transformativeness exceptions in setting out how fair use 
should be applied to copyrighted works that have been 
transferred from their original medium onto a digital format.  An 
analysis of how courts have strayed from previously established 
transformativeness doctrine and applied a broader concept in the 
new context of mass digitization follows. 
A. Changes in How Courts Have Applied Transformativeness in 
Mass Digitization Cases 
1. Lack of a New Purpose with a New Meaning 
Transformativeness has been interpreted as creating a new 
work that alters the original with a new expression, meaning, 
insight or message, and does not merely supersede the original.192  
As established early on in Texaco and Infinity, 
transformativeness turns on whether the use of a copyrighted 
work has a new purpose, which creates a new meaning.193  In 
both of those cases, that new purpose was not established since 
the secondary works were merely verbatim copies of the original 
and were used for the same purposes of retaining original journal 
articles and listening to a transmission of a radio broadcast.194  
However, courts recently found in favor of transformativeness 
where no new purpose exists.195  In many of the cases mentioned 
earlier, with the exception of Georgia State University and 
HathiTrust, the courts have determined that the fact that the 
191 See supra Part III. 
192 See Fair Use in Digital Works, supra note 42. 
193 See supra Part II. 
194 Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1994). 
195 See supra Part III. 
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original work was digitized and aggregated in an electronic form 
somehow transformed it in a new and insightful way with a 
different purpose from the original.196  These courts have held 
that the existence of digital versions of the copyrighted sources 
added a layer of transformativeness to the use where previously, 
similar uses may not have been transformative.197  For example, 
although it was done for the purpose of spreading information 
rather than entertainment, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in Infinity Broadcast Corp. reasoned that 
the retransmission of radio broadcasts from distant cities was not 
transformative.198  However, the court noted that a difference in 
purpose is not the same as transformativeness.199  Kirkwood’s 
retransmission of the broadcast left its character unchanged, and 
the court found no new expression or meaning in it.200  Further, 
the court stated that talent scouts—the audience of these 
transmissions—would be listening for informational value, but 
would still receive the entertainment value of the content rather 
than the factual content.201 
In some cases discussed in Part III, such as Perfect 10, White, 
and Google, the purpose of the secondary use persuaded the 
courts to find that the use was transformative without much 
change to its character or meaning.202  Perfect 10 illustrates this 
judicial expansion of the new purpose principle: the images in 
Google’s search engine were claimed to have a different purpose 
from the original because a search engine is inherently 
transformative—it turns copyrighted images into pointers that 
direct users to information.203  This argument seems tenuous for 
a number of reasons.  First, comparing this case to Infinity 
Broadcast Corp., the audience would still derive the original 
benefit from this secondary use.  The Second Circuit stated in 
Infinity that the talent scouts could still be entertained from the 
informational broadcasts.204  Here, while Google and Arriba 
provided these thumbnail images as links to other informational 
196 See supra Part III. 
197 See supra Part III. 
198 Infinity Broad., 150 F.3d at 108. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 See supra Part III. 
203 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
204 Infinity Broad., 150 F.3d at 108. 
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websites, they are still linking to the full-size images from which 
users will derive the original entertainment value and compete 
with plaintiff’s copyrighted images.  Because these thumbnail 
images happened to be digitized, the court found they served a 
transformative purpose. 
Second, smaller, lower-resolution versions of a copyrighted 
image should not necessarily be seen as transformative.  In 
Gaylord v. U.S., the Federal Circuit determined that a stamp 
displaying images of a Korean War memorial sculpture, called 
The Column, was not transformative in character.205  While the 
stamp portrayed an image of the sculptures surrounded by snow 
and muted the color to suggest “a dream-like presence of ghostly 
figures,”206 the court found no transformation of character, 
meaning or message.207  Snow and muted color changed nothing 
about the character of The Column.  If a small-sized stamp of an 
image of a sculpture is not seen as transformative in character, it 
is questionable why a smaller and lower-resolution copy of a 
photograph could be seen as such just because it is part of an 
electronic search engine.  While the image acts as a pointer to 
sources of information, it still directs users to an unlawful full-
size version of the copyrighted image.  The holding in Perfect 10 
effectively muddles the already unclear understanding of what 
constitutes transformative use and could lead to more confusion 
in future cases involving digitization of copyrighted materials. 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit did acknowledge that Perfect 
10 licensed a third party to sell and distribute its reduced-size 
copyrighted images for download and use on cell phones.208  
Mobile users could download and save the images from Google 
and use them on their cell phones for free rather than purchase 
Perfect 10’s copyrighted images,209 which would suggest that 
Google’s use superseded Perfect 10’s use and interfered with the 
market for these types of images.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit, at 
an early stage of the proceedings, concluded that “the 
transformative nature of Google’s use is more significant than 
any incidental superseding use or the minor commercial aspects 
205 Gaylord v. U.S., 595 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
206 Id. at 1373–74. 
207 Id. 
208 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1157. 
209 Id. at 1165–66. 
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of Google’s search engine and website.”210  In this way, the Ninth 
Circuit expanded the previous concept of a new purpose that does 
not exploit the original’s value, and found that even when 
secondary use provides the same value as the original and 
supersedes the commercial rights of the copyright holder, a use 
can still be transformative. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s rationale in Cambridge University 
Press was more consistent with prior findings of 
transformativeness, such as the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Princeton University Press.  Its finding that Cambridge 
University Press had not made a secondary use of the original 
with a new purpose was based on the fact that the purpose for 
the use was the same—to provide university students with 
reading material.211  It exploited the original’s value and meaning 
because it superseded the University’s need to purchase more 
reading materials for students.212  As in Princeton University 
Press, copying and providing students with course materials was 
not transformative and did not have a new purpose from that of 
the original work’s purpose.  The court’s holding is also more in 
line with earlier fair use cases such as Campbell, which 
established that transformativeness adds a new purpose and 
meaning to a work and does not supersede the value of the 
original.213 
2. Expansion of Educational and Social Benefit Considerations 
Beyond Statutory Limits 
Section 107 states that the first factor to consider under a 
fair use exception is “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.”214  Beyond referring to 
educational purposes, this provision does not mention 
considerations of a general social benefit derived from the use.  
Since the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, social benefit 
considerations have been part of courts’ analyses of the first 
factor of § 107, and they further the objectives of copyright in the 
210 Id. at 1167. 
211 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1263 (11th Cir. 2014). 
212 Id. 
213 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
214 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1992). 
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progress of the arts.215  However, courts have increasingly begun 
to find transformativeness based largely on a perceived public 
benefit from such verbatim copying regardless of a lack of a new 
purpose.216  This trend runs counter to United States Supreme 
Court precedent.  In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises,217 the Court stated: 
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to 
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest 
importance to the public.  Such a notion ignores the major 
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike.  “[T]o 
propose that fair use be imposed whenever the ‘social value [of 
dissemination] . . . outweighs any detriment to the artist,’ would 
be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the 
property precisely when they encounter those users who could 
afford to pay for it.”218 
Earlier precedent established that merely copying an original 
work should not count as transformative even if there is an 
educational or social benefit of the copy.  The court in Texaco 
found that the secondary use of the photocopied journal articles 
could not pass as transformative, regardless of the potential for 
more efficient research processes and greater scientific 
developments, since the use superseded the journal’s original 
creation.219  By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Kelly held that the 
thumbnail images at issue were transformative because a search 
215 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Like less ostensibly humorous forms of 
criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in 
the process, creating a new one.”); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2607 (2009) (“While agreeing that Accolade had a 
commercial purpose in making copies of Sega games, the court thought that Sega's 
insistence that it must presume unfairness was ‘far too simple and ignores a number 
of important considerations.’ A closer look at Accolade's purpose revealed that it had 
the legitimate and nonexploitative purpose of studying the functional requirements 
for achieving compatibility with the Genesis console. The court was, moreover, ‘free 
to consider the public benefit resulting from a particular use,’ which in Sega had ‘led 
to an increase in the number of independently designed video game programs offered 
for use with the Genesis console,’ which was ‘precisely the kind of growth in creative 
expression . . . that the Copyright Act was intended to promote.’ ” (quoting Sega 
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1522–24 (9th Cir. 1992) (footnotes 
omitted)). 
216 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
217 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
218 Id. at 559 (quoting Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982)) (alterations in original). 
219 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
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engine is transformative in nature and provides a public 
benefit.220  By enhancing Internet users’ ability to gather 
information, Arriba Soft was promoting the goals of the 
Copyright Act.221  The court did not elaborate further on why a 
public benefit was such a substantial part of the transformative 
use finding, but it seemed to circularly hold that the use was 
transformative because it was fair.222  Similarly, in Perfect 10, the 
Ninth Circuit again held that the search engine was 
transformative because it was socially beneficial in converting an 
original work into an electronic reference tool, and this 
outweighed any superseding and commercial use of the images.223  
This was similar to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sony, where 
the Court reviewed the public benefits of time-shifting, the start 
of a later trend holding that copyright law should “accommodate 
new technological developments that benefit the public.”224  
However, recalling the Court’s words in Harper & Row several 
years later, granting less protection for works when new 
technologies make use of them simply because they are perceived 
as beneficial to the public would be injurious not only to the 
incentivizing goals of copyright law, but also in diminishing 
authors’ rights in their creations.225 
Courts also seem to rule in favor of transformativeness in 
digital library cases because of the general benefit they perceive.  
The court in Authors Guild v. Google held that scanning entire 
copyrighted works and making them available to supplying 
libraries, and publicly displaying snippets of them on the Google 
Books library was transformative because of the resulting benefit 
of increased access to and identification of books.226  In his 
analysis of the Google Books project, Barry Sookman questions 
the district court’s rationale in finding the project to be 
transformative.227  He states that Google’s only activities were to 
provide libraries with digital copies of books, but that the copies 
220 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2002). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
224 Manali Shah, Fair Use and the Google Book Search Project: The Case for 
Creating Digital Libraries, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 569, 605–06 (2007); see Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984). 
225 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985). 
226 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
227 Sookman, supra note 40, at 487–88. 
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themselves were not transformative just because they were in a 
different format.228  He cites to a long line of case law, which 
establishes that “commercial for-profit enterprises have not been 
able to stand in the shoes of their customers who make non-profit 
[sic] or non-commercial [sic] uses and to claim the benefit of their 
transformative non-commercial [sic] activities.”229  The court did 
not consider these authorities when finding transformativeness 
based on the benefits to readers, scholars, and researchers.230 
3. Transformativeness of Copies in a New Medium Without a 
New Purpose 
The courts in the cases discussed above have strayed from 
the principle established in Texaco that changing the object 
embodying the original work does not alone constitute 
transformativeness.231  The Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 found that 
a search engine automatically transforms a work since it 
transforms images into pointers of information232 without 
considering whether any new expression was added to the work 
itself.  The Second Circuit in HathiTrust found that the digital 
library was transformative in purpose since the authors of the 
original works did not create them for purposes of a full-text 
search database,233 implying that the copied works were 
automatically transformed since they were digitally reproduced.  
However, the Eleventh Circuit in Cambridge University Press did 
follow this precedent when it held that the copies on the 
electronic reserve system were merely verbatim copies with no 
new meaning, and were not transformative just because they had 
been converted into an electronic format.234 
B. Cautionary Implications of the Further Expansion of 
Transformativeness 
The advantages of finding a transformative purpose for 
many of the new digital means of reproducing and distributing 
works are plenty.  Users have increased access to information, 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 488 (footnote omitted). 
230 Id. at 495. 
231 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994). 
232 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
233 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014). 
234 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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have more efficient research tools at their disposal, reap 
numerous benefits in education, and society in general is able to 
make use of a copyright holder’s work for the creation of other 
works.  In a sense, this does further the Copyright goals of 
advancing society’s progress in science and the useful arts.  
However, as Barry Sookman stated: 
The question is not whether projects like Google Books that 
have social benefits should be encouraged.  It is whether 
authors that invested years of front-end efforts in creating 
copyrighted works, and to whom the Copyright Clause seeks to 
incentivize to continue to make such investments, should have 
the right to authorize these new uses.235 
The courts in iParadigms and White both found a 
transformative purpose in that the electronic services prevented 
plagiarism in a way that did not impair the market for high 
school papers236 and created an interactive legal research tool 
that did not impair the market for litigation briefs.237  While this 
finding may work for these two situations, it creates a slippery 
slope in other circumstances.  If transformativeness continues to 
expand, copyright holders may lose control over their works and 
how they are used in digital contexts where a minimally different 
purpose is shown and where courts do not perceive a significant 
impact on the market.238  They may not even be entitled to 
receive a reasonable compensation for the uses, and commercial 
for-profit entities such as Google may successfully claim a 
nonprofit use of a copyrighted work and benefit from the 
transformative finding of their activities.239  If 
transformativeness continues to be so liberally applied—
potentially increasing the amount of fair use outcomes—it could 
potentially decrease economic incentives to create new works and 
harm the overarching goal of copyright law.240  While profit is not 
the sole factor that spurs creativity,241 creators require some 
235 Sookman, supra note 40, at 514. 
236 A.V. ex rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 636 (4th Cir. 2009). 
237 White v. West Publ’g Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
238 Sookman, supra note 40, at 513–14. 
239 Id. at 513. 
240 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2014). 
241 See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515–16 (2009) (“[T]he individual reports 
of how creativity is experienced as unpredictable, tyrannical, obsessive, and joyful 
are consistent with the thesis that creativity arises from unplanned and stochastic 
encounters with the world around us. One reason that economic narratives are so 
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recoupment of their investments to continue to create, and there 
is genuine concern that certain works that require a substantial 
up-front investment will no longer be created.242  Furthermore, 
“digital technology can make libraries and creators competitors 
by eliminating all of the distinctions between library and right 
holder enabled access except cost.  It is virtually impossible to 
compete with ‘free.’ ”243  Incentives to continue to create would 
diminish, and copyright holders’ exclusive rights to their own 
works and control over the market for their works would be 
compromised. 
Part of the reason for the expansion of transformativeness is 
courts’ over-emphasis of a use’s public benefit.  Professor Jane 
Ginsburg believes this trend is a way that courts “bless uses of 
entire works in the perceived public interest.”244  The courts in 
HathiTrust and the Google Books case believed that rejecting a 
transformative and fair use defense would be adverse to the 
public interest, and this was a major reason why they found for 
transformativeness and, ultimately, fair use.245  Ginsburg makes 
an interesting point that illustrates how some courts may 
already decide to find in favor of transformativeness due to 
public benefits and then tailor their analyses of the four factors 
to match that finding—a phenomenon Professor Barton Beebe 
calls “stamped[ing].”246  She provides the example that in Perfect 
10, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff failed to show there 
was a market for its images for cell phone use.247  Once it was 
reminded that fair use is an affirmative defense and the 
defendant had the burden of showing it did not interfere in the 
market for plaintiff’s work, the court amended its opinion, but 
did not change its result.248  This may suggest, as Ginsburg does,  
 
 
limited is that they cannot tell us how preferences to create are shaped, nourished, 
or crushed by the social structures that inevitably frame all human interaction.”). 
242 Lois F. Wasoff, If Mass Digitization Is the Problem, Is Legislation the 
Solution? Some Practical Considerations Related to Copyright, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 731, 742 (2011). 
243 Id. 
244 Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1411. 
245 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F.Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
246 Beebe, supra note 29, at 555. 
247 Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1413. 
248 Id. 
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that the burden was of no matter to the court since it had already 
decided it would rule in favor of fair use due to the public benefit 
of the search engine.249 
In determining whether a use qualifies for the fair use 
exception, the courts’ overall objective is to determine if the use is 
fair and socially beneficial enough that it should overcome the 
copyright owner’s monopoly.250  In considering all four factors of 
§ 107, a court attempts to ascertain whether the use is so 
creative and insightful that it should be allowed to exist to 
further the progress of the creative arts in society.  Utilizing the 
canon of construction of avoiding surplusage,251 if a court 
considers whether or not a particular use is socially beneficial 
under the first factor, it may defeat the purpose of the fair use 
analysis as a whole.  Put another way, a character and purpose 
that is socially beneficial would determine the social utility and 
fair use of the secondary user’s use without analyzing the rest of 
the factors.  Congress did not include social benefit as a 
consideration in the statute and likely did not intend to make the 
rest of the factors it enumerated in § 107 unnecessary after 
determining a public benefit in the first factor.  For this reason, 
courts should not give so much weight to a public benefit as a 
transformative purpose or character of a use.  The first factor 
analysis may be better suited for the nonprofit, educational, and 
commerciality inquiry as it was applied in Sony. 
C. Considerations To Abate the Expansion of 
Transformativeness 
Concern about the current status and future of 
transformative use also exists at the legislative level.  Two 
months after the district court decided the Google Books case, 
249 Id. 
250 Samuelson, supra note 215, at 2540 (“A well-recognized strength of the fair 
use doctrine is the considerable flexibility it provides in balancing the interests of 
copyright owners in controlling exploitations of their works and the interests of 
subsequent authors in drawing from earlier works when expressing themselves, as 
well as the interests of the public in having access to new works and making 
reasonable uses of them.”). 
251 Katherine Clark & Matthew Connolly, A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and 
Applying Statutes, GEORGETOWN U. L. CENTER 6 (Apr. 2006), http://www.law.george 
town.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/upl 
oad/statutoryinterpretation.pdf (“This rule is based on the principle that each word 
or phrase in the statute is meaningful and useful, and thus, an interpretation that 
would render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless should be rejected.”). 
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Congress held a subcommittee hearing regarding 
transformativeness before the House Judiciary Committee’s 
subcommittee.252  Among the concerns expressed by the members 
present at the hearing were that “specific statutory limitations 
have not kept pace with emerging technologies”253 and “that the 
transformative use standard has become ‘all things to all 
people.’ ”254  Copyright law seeks to protect the interests of the 
copyright holder while balancing the interests of society in the 
progress of the arts, but recent cases involving mass digitization 
have expanded transformativeness to encompass any digitization 
with a public benefit.255  Some have argued that the balance of 
copyright law has shifted to giving potential infringers the 
benefit of the doubt in the increased findings of 
transformativeness.256 
Furthermore, there is the potential for transformativeness to 
grow out of control in future digitization cases where the 
purported use is for research and dissemination of information.  
A digital library that allows free public access to entire copies of 
works could potentially pass the transformativeness inquiry 
under the current trend.  With the continued expansion of this 
concept of transformativeness, it is not unimaginable that a court 
may view a digital library with certain search functions similar 
to those in White and the Google Books case that gives unfettered 
access to whole works as a public benefit with a purpose of 
promoting research and information.  Under a fair use 
determination, copyright owners would lose control over the 
entirety of their works.  While there is an exception for 
educational purposes as evidenced by § 107 of the Copyright Act, 
many uses can be claimed as educational or furthering research 
and information gathering as the courts found in HathiTrust, 
White, and the Google Books case.  As a result, courts should 
carefully examine to what extent the particular digitization 
project changes the purpose or character of the original.  It is 
untenable that verbatim copying, digitizing, and aggregating a 
particular source changes its original purpose and character to 
252 Edward E. Weiman, Transforming Use, L.A. LAW., June 2014, at 19. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
256 Kelly Morris, “Transforming” Fair Use: Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 15 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE EDITION 170, 203–04 (2014). 
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one that is so fundamentally different that it is a different work.  
If it serves the same purpose as the original and the only 
difference is that it is converted to a different medium such as 
the Internet, then this should weigh against a finding of 
transformativeness.  As the court in Princeton University Press 
suggested, a holding that finds verbatim copies of a work to be 
transformative—and ultimately fair use, because they were 
packaged with other works—contradicts the incentivizing goals 
of copyright.  An author who loses control over exercising his or 
her statutory rights to a copyrighted work because a secondary 
user made exact copies of that work, and digitized and 
aggregated it with numerous other works, would at least have 
reservations about creating further copyrightable works, whether 
because of lost income or the appropriation of their personal 
creations. 
To balance the objectives of copyright law, the harm to the 
copyright holder should also be considered.  While public benefit 
of a use is important to the overall fair use doctrine, it should not 
be the pivotal consideration in determining transformativeness.  
It is not within the judicial realm to decide what use benefits 
society, especially one involving the relatively new practice of 
digitization whose benefits may be inconclusive at the 
beginning.257  A case such as Perfect 10 may not pass this 
analysis, since as a digitized image, it does not add anything new 
by being on the Internet and still allows users to view the full-
sized copyrighted image as they would have offline.  By contrast, 
the iParadigms case may pass this digital transformative test 
since the digitization of the paper allows the teacher to compare 
it to other digitized writings to ascertain originality, which could 
not be done offline. 
Licensing is another possible solution discussed by both the 
Copyright Office and by scholars who are concerned about uses 
that profit from a fair use defense.258  While mass digitization 
may make licensing difficult due to the large-scale number of 
works involved and the barriers to obtaining the necessary rights 
to them,259  several recommendations have been made.  The 
Copyright Office discusses the use of direct licensing as the most 
basic option where voluntary agreements are made between 
257 Lee, supra note 36, at 839. 
258 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 16. 
259 Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1407. 
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digitizers and copyright holders on an individual basis.260  
Copyright holders and potential licensees could find resources 
and information on licensing on the Internet, and could connect 
with each other to explore and reach an agreement about 
licensing a work.261  The drawbacks of this option, however, are 
that potential licensees would need to undertake significant 
efforts to identify copyright owners, locate them, and negotiate a 
licensing arrangement for voluminous amounts of works.262  The 
costs of clearing rights may outweigh the benefits, making a fair 
use defense more appealing to potential licensees seeking to 
digitize works.263 
A second type of licensing scheme, which may reduce 
transaction costs, is collective licensing, where copyright holders 
authorize third party organizations to administer reproduction, 
distribution, and display rights of their works.264  The third party 
organizations negotiate licenses with users, collect royalties, and 
distribute them to copyright holders.265  Rights are precleared 
and prepriced.266  However, collective licensing has primarily 
been used for licensing excerpts of works for specified uses, such 
as educational uses for coursepacks and e-reserve systems, and 
not for entire works or digital distribution.267  There are some 
surmountable challenges to collective licensing: 
The information that has to be collected is not static.  It is 
dynamic and changes constantly.  Rights are assigned or revert; 
companies are bought and sold; individuals move, get married 
and divorced and eventually die.  All those changes have to be 
tracked in the database for millions of works, individuals and 
entities.268 
While some believe that mass digitization uses are fair and 
should be entirely free because of their public benefit and the 
lack of feasible licensing structures to enable the uses,269 a better 
approach to consider might be Professor Ginsburg’s concept of 
260 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 16, at 30. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1410. 
264 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 16, at 31. 
265 Id. 
266 Wasoff, supra note 242, at 732. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 735. 
269 Weiman, supra note 252, at 20. 
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“Permitted but Paid.”  She argues that copyright law should 
distinguish new distributions from new works, and free fair use 
should only be applied to new works, while “Permitted by Paid” 
uses would fall under the new distributions category.270  She 
divides uses into the categories subsidy uses—socially worthy 
redistributions—and market failure uses—where transaction 
costs are too high for licensing solutions.271  Furthermore: 
Where the use confers a public benefit and the choice is all-or-
nothing, a fair use outcome is virtually assured.  But were 
permitted-but-paid an option, we would not be lured by a 
dichotomy falsely pitting authors against a perceived social 
good.  The licensing mechanism would allow both broader 
dissemination and provide payment to authors.  One might 
rejoin that there is no need to license if the use is fair.  But in 
that class of cases where the use is “fair” only because it 
supposedly cannot reasonably be licensed, then permitted-but-
paid should replace fair use for free.272 
With the unpaid nature of fair use comes potential pressures 
on courts which may lead to a distorted analysis, and may 
explain why courts have expanded the boundaries of 
transformativeness.273  Due to the technological advancements 
that are able to increase access to information through digital 
means, courts equate transformativeness with the social benefits 
they perceive from these uses.274  Having certain uses remain 
paid may lead courts to more judiciously analyze the true 
transformativeness of a use. 
CONCLUSION 
Transformativeness has itself undergone a transformation 
since its inception in Campbell and during the evolution of the 
way works are copied.  The doctrine began as a way of 
ascertaining that a secondary use had not superseded the 
original work but had made a significant change so that it 
provided some new purpose or character.  It has since evolved 
into a measure of court-perceived social benefits.  With 
increasing digitization of copyrighted works, this doctrine that 
270 Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 1386. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 1386–87. 
273 Id. at 1385. 
274 Id. 
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has already been inconsistently interpreted and applied by courts 
has become even murkier.  There seems to be little uniformity or 
rationale among the way courts have defined and applied a 
transformative use test.  In the future, this could lead to more 
overly-broad findings of transformativeness where a digitized 
version of a copyrighted work does not add any new or insightful 
purpose or character, and would disrupt the balance of copyright 
law objectives.  Courts must conduct a more in-depth analysis 
when examining digital fair use and take care not to find in favor 
of transformativeness simply because the verbatim digital copies 
may provide public benefits.  In addition, licensing options should 
be further examined to find possible solutions, which will 
maintain the progress of public knowledge while respecting 
copyright owners’ exclusive rights, and may halt the continued 
expansion of transformativeness. 
